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Abstract
Background: Large international humanitarian actors support and directly deliver health services for millions of
people in crises annually, and wield considerable power to decide which health services to provide, how and to
whom, across a vast spectrum of health areas. Despite decades of reform aiming to improve accountability in the
sector, public health practice among humanitarian actors is not heavily scrutinized in either the countries where
they are headquartered or those where they provide healthcare. We surveyed current healthcare governance
practice among large international humanitarian actors to better understand what organisations are doing to
ensure oversight and accountability for health services in humanitarian responses.
Methods: The term ‘healthcare governance’ was defined and categorised into seven domains: implementation of
health management information systems (HMIS) and use of resulting data; professional development of health
sector staff; audits of health service performance; management of clinical incidents; evidence-based practice;
pharmaceutical supply; and beneficiary engagement. Senior health professionals at 32 leading international actors
providing humanitarian health services were contacted between July and August 2019 to complete a 109-question
online survey about their organisation’s practice in these domains.
Results: Respondents from 13 organisations completed the questionnaire. Healthcare governance practices were
undertaken to varying degrees by all organisations but were often driven by donor requirements and external
factors rather than improvement of programme performance. Common strengths were the inclusion of governance
in organisational policies, high availability of technical guidelines, and close monitoring of pharmaceutical services.
Recurring weaknesses were poor beneficiary engagement, inconsistent use of health information for decision
making, unsystematic implementation of healthcare audits, inconsistent management of clinical incidents, and lack
of training and professional development opportunities.
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Conclusions: To our knowledge, this is the first study to describe healthcare governance practice among
humanitarian actors. Leading international humanitarian healthcare providers are already implementing many
healthcare governance activities; however, these are inconsistently applied and generally not reflective of systematic
policies or earmarked organisational resources. There is a need for sector-wide consensus on how the humanitarian
sector defines healthcare governance, the domains that constitute it, which actors in the humanitarian system are
implicated, and how malpractice should be systematically addressed.
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Background
In 2019, 168 million people worldwide required humani-
tarian assistance [1] to mitigate the effects of armed
conflict, natural disasters and political instability. Inter-
national non-governmental organisations (NGOs), along
with United Nations agencies and the Red Cross and
Red Crescent movement, receive the vast majority of
formal global funding for humanitarian assistance [2]
and directly or indirectly support the delivery of critical
health services for these populations.
The ‘humanitarian system’ is a network of mostly au-
tonomous actors with varying mandates, funding sources
and technical expertise [3]. Actors responsible for
providing health services can be seen as forming a sub-
system within this broader network. This system is not
governed in the conventional sense, with no overarching
body to answer to. From the perspective of beneficiaries,
multilateral organisations (e.g. the World Health
Organization, WHO) are mostly exempt from legal ac-
countability, while other international humanitarian ac-
tors are typically neither subject to stringent scrutiny
where they are headquartered (e.g. in England and
Wales, the Charity Commission does not proactively
monitor the quality of NGO services provided abroad)
nor in the locations where they provide humanitarian
services. While the latter may depend on local legislation
and the capacity and intentions of host governments, in
practice, most crisis contexts are characterized by weak
governance and a breakdown of law and order [3].
Despite this lack of accountability, humanitarian
health actors have de facto responsibility. They wield
considerable power to decide which health services to
provide, how and to whom, across a vast spectrum ran-
ging from epidemic response to antenatal care and
trauma surgery. Whether they set up their own health
facilities or support pre-existing health services, their
role arguably implicates them in ensuring that service
delivery attains a minimum acceptable performance.
Furthermore, this responsibility may be widely shared –
for example, the response to a polio outbreak in
opposition-held areas of Syria involved international do-
nors funding international NGOs. The latter, in turn,
sub-contracted local NGOs and supported local ex-
Ministry of Health clinicians to deliver the response. At
the same time, UN agencies provided technical co-
ordination and procured vaccines (F Checchi, pers.
Comm.).
Signified by the growing field of ‘humanitarian govern-
ance’ and a shift towards ethics concerned with the
consequences, rather than the duties, of humanitarian
aid [4, 5], there have been repeated attempts in recent
years to improve the co-ordination and effectiveness of
humanitarian response, often after evident systemic
failures [4, 6, 7] (Table 1). These may have fostered in-
creasing standardization, professionalization and ac-
countability [18]. For example, the Sphere Project’s [12]
minimum standards in humanitarian response, while
voluntary and based on imperfect evidence, are widely
perceived as useful [19].
Yet poor decision-making – either through commis-
sion or omission - remains common in humanitarian
responses [2, 20]. Such malpractice is not well docu-
mented, and evaluations of humanitarian action are
often of low-quality [21], making it challenging to quan-
tify impacts on beneficiaries. Globally, harmful health-
care practice is estimated to affect one in four
outpatients, resulting in 2.6 million preventable deaths
annually [22]. Humanitarian responses are highlighted as
a particular concern for improving the quality of health-
care provision globally [23].
While clinical malpractice (e.g. unsafe surgical prac-
tices, inaccurate diagnosis and prescription) is well
recognised, public health malpractice (e.g. inappropriate
decisions on which health services to provide; abrupt
interruption of services; sub-standard service provision)
is harder to define, but potentially even more harmful.
To the extent that such malpractice occurs in the hu-
manitarian health sector, it wastes resources, damages
the reputation of actors with implications for fundraising
and recruitment, and causes moral distress for individ-
uals working in the field [24]. Critically, it undermines
the primary aim of humanitarian health action to reduce
crisis-attributable morbidity and mortality.
In resource-rich settings, a set of deeply institutional-
ized policies and practices definable broadly as ‘health-
care governance’ has become fundamental to preventing
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and mitigating malpractice and ensuring public account-
ability of health services. There is no unifying definition
of healthcare governance [25] and most conceptualisa-
tions underscore the centrality of national government
and long-term strategic planning for health systems
making them less applicable to humanitarian health re-
sponses [26–28].
The published literature offers few examples of hu-
manitarian actors adopting elements of healthcare gov-
ernance. Kersten et al. piloted a quality-of-care audit
tool in a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) project in
South Sudan [29], finding deficits across all service areas.
Shanks et al. describe experience implementing a volun-
tary medical error reporting system across MSF projects
in 18 countries [30], showing that a substantial propor-
tion of reported errors caused harm (39.1%) or death
(23.5%). Both reports focus only on the clinical aspect of
healthcare malpractice.
The contribution of the study presented in this paper
is therefore as a first step towards a more systematic and
sector-wide understanding of healthcare governance in
humanitarian crises by surveying current policies and
practices relating to healthcare governance in large
international humanitarian health NGOs.
Table 1 Summary of major reforms and initiatives related to governance and accountability of the humanitarian system
Reform or Initiative Lead organisation(s) Description Year
IASC (Inter-agency Standing
Committee)
OCHA (Office for Co-ordination
of Humanitarian Affairs)
Humanitarian co-ordination forum for the UN system to
ensure coherence of preparedness and response efforts,
formulate policy and agree on priorities for strengthened
humanitarian action [8].
1992
Code of Conduct IFRC (International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies)
Voluntary code to maintain high standards of
independence, effectiveness and impact to which other
NGOs are signatories [9].
1994
People In Aid People In Aid International network of relief and development agencies
committed to improving human resources management
through the People in Aid Code of Best Practice [10].
Merged with HAP-I to form CHS Alliance in 2014 [3].
1995
ALNAP (Active Learning Network
for Accountability and Performance)
ALNAP Global network of NGOs, UN agencies, members of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, donors, academics,
networks and consultants dedicated to learning how to
improve response to humanitarian crises [11].
1997
Humanitarian charter & minimum
standards in humanitarian response
Sphere Association Humanitarian charter is a voluntary commitment of shared
principles, rights and obligations for ensuring the welfare of
crisis-affected populations. Minimum standards for health,
WASH, nutrition, food security and shelter with suggestions




HAP-I Multi-agency initiative and first body for self-regulation in
humanitarian sector. Created the HAP Standard in
Accountability and Quality Management. Merged with People
in Aid to form CHS Alliance in 2014 [3].
2003
Cluster system WHO Co-ordination of humanitarian response at the global and
crisis response level to ensure predictable leadership and
accountability in all main sectors, strengthen system-wide
preparedness and technical capacity in humanitarian
emergencies [13].
2005
Transformative agenda IASC Set of concrete actions aimed at improving the timeliness
and effectiveness of the collective response through stronger
leadership, more effective co-ordination structures and
improved accountability for performance and to affected
people [14].
2011
Core Humanitarian Standard on
Quality and Accountability
CHS Alliance (formerly HAP-I
and People in Aid), Sphere,
Groupe URD, HQAI
Voluntary standard made up of nine commitments with key
actions and organisational responsibilities to improve the




HQAI NGO providing services for benchmarking, verification and
certification against the Core Humanitarian Standard [16].
2015
Grand Bargain IASC Agreement between donor governments, UN agencies and
aid organisations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of international humanitarian aid particularly focussed on
transparency, better co-ordination and reform to
humanitarian financing [17].
2016
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Methods
Scope and definitions
Given the lack of a definition of healthcare governance
appropriate to humanitarian contexts, we expanded the
concept of clinical governance first implemented in the
United Kingdom National Health Service (NHS) [31] to
apply it to the range of healthcare activities conducted
by international humanitarian actors. We chose to base
our design on the concept of clinical governance for sev-
eral reasons: first, it can be applied to both state-citizen
and NGO-beneficiary relationships; second, it describes
responsibilities and processes particular to healthcare
delivery and thus provides a framework for asking
specific questions about how quality and safety of care
are managed in practice; and finally, it is likely to be fa-
miliar to health practitioners as well as organisations
that provide health services in the humanitarian sector
making it a starting point for discussing this topic.
We then defined ‘healthcare governance’ as ‘the set of
rules, structures and mechanisms for collective decision-
making employed by international humanitarian health
actors in the pursuit of providing effective and safe
health care’.
We further specified seven domains of healthcare gov-
ernance (based on the ‘seven pillars’ described for the
NHS) [32] that we assumed would apply to any modality
of humanitarian health action: implementation of health
management information systems and use of resulting
data; professional development of health sector staff;
audits of health service performance; management of
clinical incidents; evidence-based practice; pharmaceut-
ical supply; and beneficiary engagement (see Fig. 1 for
details). We constrained our survey to the humanitarian
health sector, which typically excludes nutrition and
water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services. Accord-
ingly, we referred to the International Classification of
Diseases [33] to define seven broad service areas into
which both clinical and public health activites can be
categorised: endemic infectious diseases; epidemics; HIV
and tuberculosis; maternal, neonatal, reproductive and
sexual health; non-communicable diseases; mental
health; injuries.
Survey design
We developed a structured questionnaire (see Add-
itional file 1) based on the seven domains above, consist-
ing of 109 mostly close-ended questions. We invited
respondents to provide details or upload relevant organ-
isational documents to illustrate domain-specific policies
or practices and add free-text comments at the end of
each section.
Study participants
We selected international NGOs and the Red Cross /
Red Crescent (RC) movement, as we wished to investi-
gate policies and practices among actors proximally and
operationally involved in health service delivery or sup-
port (as opposed to donors or UN specialised agencies
that are generally not directly involved in health service
provision [34]). As an introductory, rather than a com-
prehensive, exploration of healthcare governance in the
humanitarian health sector, we surveyed the largest
international health actors in terms of size and global
footprint, and who conceivably have the most significant
Fig. 1 Definitions of the domains of healthcare governance
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influence on practice in the sector and health outcomes
for crisis-affected populations. Accordingly, we firstly se-
lected all international NGO and RC actors (including
national RC societies) that received contributions ≥2.5
million USD during 2018 for health sector projects, ac-
cording to the Office for the Co-ordination of Humani-
tarian Affairs (OCHA)‘s Financial Tracking Service
(FTS) [35]. We supplemented this list with additional
international organisations that were members of the
Global Health Cluster as of June 2018 and all oper-
ational centres (sections) of MSF (the latter receive
mainly private funding and are thus not well captured in
the FTS database).
Survey implementation
Utilising publicly available contact details and our pro-
fessional network, we invited by email the most senior
health technical expert within the organisation (e.g.
medical directors at MSF) to complete the survey.
Where we could not identify such an individual, we used
generic contact information for that organisation to so-
licit participation. We administered the survey through
an online platform (Jisc Online Surveys) [36]. We in-
formed participants that individual organisation re-
sponses would be visible to the researchers but
anonymised in publications arising from the study.
Ethics
Participants read an online information sheet and pro-
vided online written consent. The study was approved
by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
Ethics Committee (ref. 15704).
Results
Profile of responding organisations
Data were collected during August and September 2019.
Out of 32 organisations invited, 13 completed the
questionnaire with a total of 16 individual responses –
referred to as key informants (Table 2); 19 organisations
declined due to competing work priorities or did not
reply; no refusals were recorded. All 13 organisations
were operating in more than one continent. All provided
services directly to the affected population, and all but
one (12/13, 92.3%) also worked in support of the local
health system. They worked at the community (13/13,
100%), primary care (13/13, 100%) and, less commonly,
secondary care level (8/13, 61.5%). Just under half (6/13,
46.2%) of the organisations described working across all
seven disease areas. The remaining results are reported
as individual responses by key informants with variation
in the denominator reflecting incomplete data for that
question.
All key informants reported that their organisation
had a policy on governance and accountability, two-
thirds of which (10/15, 66.7%) covered health services.
Most reported that there was an executive or team re-
sponsible for each of the seven governance domains in
the survey. However, a lower proportion reported a for-
mal pathway for escalating issues relating to the domains
(Table 3).
Domains of healthcare governance
Health management information system (HMIS)
A majority of organisations implemented a HMIS (13/
16, 81.3%) but only four (n = 16, 25.0%) did so in all
countries of operation. DHIS2 (10/16, 62.5%) and
Table 2 List of participating organisations in alphabetical order with




International Federation of the Red Cross 1 HQ
International Rescue Committee (IRC) 1 Country Office
Intersos 1 HQ
Médecins du Monde (MDM) Belgium 1 HQ
Médecins Sans Frontières – Operational
Centre Brussels (OCB)
1 HQ
Médecins Sans Frontières – Operational
Centre Paris (OCP)
1 HQ
Médecins Sans Frontières – Operational
Centre Geneva (OCG)
1 HQ
Médecins Sans Frontières – International
Bureau
1 HQ
Medical Teams International 1 HQ
MENTOR Initiative 1 HQ
Mercy Malaysia 1 HQ
Norwegian Red Cross (NRC) 1 HQ
Première Urgence Internationale 1 Country Office
Relief International 1 HQ
Save The Children 1 HQ
World Vision International 1 HQ
Table 3 Number (%) of respondents with a designated
executive or team and with an established escalation pathway
for oversight of each governance area (N = 16)
Governance area Responsible executive




HMIS 13 (81.3) 10 (62.5)
Professional development 12 (75.0) 7 (43.8)
Health audit 12 (75.0) 10 (62.5)
Incident management 10 (62.5) 9 (56.3)
Evidence based practice 12 (75.0) 8 (50)
Beneficiary engagement 13 (81.3) 11 (68.8)
Pharmaceutical services 15 (93.8) 14 (87.5)
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Microsoft Excel (11/16, 68.8%) were the most common
software platforms, and about a third (5/16, 31.2%) also
used the local health authority HMIS system. Table 4
shows the different functional elements of HMIS
employed by the participants. HMIS data were used for
a diversity of activities – most frequently for pharma-
ceutical supply forecasting (14/16, 87.5%), reporting to
donors (14/16, 87.5%), ongoing analysis of priority health
needs (14/16, 87.5%), health service performance (13/16,
81.3%), and periodic quality reports (13/16, 81.3%). Con-
versely, feedback to beneficiaries (5/16, 31.3%) and cost-
effectiveness analysis (3/16, 18.8%) were not common
uses for HMIS. HMIS data were decreasingly available at
higher levels of each organisation: at headquarters HMIS
data was reported to be available by 64.9% (9/15) of key
informants, but even at field office level they were not
universally available (12/14, 85.7%).
Approximately two-thirds of respondents (10/16,
62.5%) felt that HMIS was adequately funded and
resourced in their organisation.
One participant commented that “the organisation
does not consider [it] a priority to engage a person to
manage and oversee a MEAL [monitoring, evaluation
and learning] strategy, therefore the workload falls on
specific (thematic) technical advisers despite the dire
need and the regular requests coming from bottom
up”[P13].
Another respondent noted limited capacity to make
use of the data by saying “a lot of data is collected but
much more could be done to use it strategically and
practically, if more resources and time were available
(both in field and HQ).”[P6] And a further comment
highlighted the incentives for using and reporting on
HMIS data: “each country program is collecting their
data in different forms based more on donors and cluster
requirements rather than for quality improvement
purpose[s]”[P15].
However, the majority of participants (11/16, 68.8%)
were able to cite positive examples of the use of HMIS
data resulting in improved patient outcomes and advo-
cacy for more resources. For example, one participant
stated that “analy[sis] of [the number] of trauma cases at
primary health care level lead to [a] change of strategy
regarding service delivery…leading in the end to [a] de-
crease in CFR (case fatality rate) for trauma cases in re-
mote areas”[P2].
Professional development
Although three quarters (12/16, 75.0%) of key infor-
mants said their organisation offered training and
development packages for health sector staff, fewer
than half (7/16, 43.8%) said their organisation had a
protected budget for professional development, and
even fewer identified a pathway to accredit staff (3/
16, 18.8%). Just over half (9/16, 56.3%) reported a
system in their organisation for appraising compe-
tencies and individual needs for continued profes-
sional development.
Regarding supervision of clinical and allied health staff,
respondents reported that in most (9/16, 56.3%) or all
(7/16, 43.8%) health care programmes that their organ-
isation delivers, there is a designated lead for monitoring
and supporting performance.
Free-text comments highlighted barriers to profes-
sional development, including lack or restricted use
of funding, poor use of available training resources
and the potential role of nepotism in accessing
opportunities:
“…there is a disparity between our field pro-
grammes, where training and development of
health staff is a fundamental part of what we
do… and HQ level where there is little to no
funding or support for senior staff development…
all programmes are donor funded…and the admin
costs allocated to HQ support for programmes by
donors do not extend to training and development
of support staff”[P9].
“There is a budget proportion that is dedicated to
training, but it is never fully utilized because the
Table 4 Number (%) of respondents using different elements of HMIS (N = 16)
Elements of HMIS Yes N (%) No N (%) Unsure N (%)
Standardized menu of indicators and data elements 15 (93.8) 1 (6.2) 0 (0)
Aggregate service data 0 (0) 16 (100) 0 (0)
Electronic medical record 6 (37.5) 8 (50.0) 2 (12.5)
Pharmaceutical consumption data 15 (93.8) 1 (6.2) 0 (0)
Programme report generation 12 (75.0) 4 (25.0) 0 (0)
Data visualization and analysis 12 (75.0) 2 (12.5) 2 (12.5)
HMIS standard operating procedures 9 (56.3) 3 (18.7) 4 (25.0)
Internal training and technical user support 11 (68.8) 4 (25.0) 1 (6.2)
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staff do not know that it exists and HR is usually
not very open on sharing information about
it”[P14].
“It is through personal relationships and personal
endeavour that higher level staff get training
opportunities”[P3].
Health service audits
Health service audits were reported to occur by two-
thirds of key informants (10/15, 66.7%) and half said
audit was part of their organisational strategy or policies
(8/16, 50.0%). Most key informants (8/13, 61.5%) were
unsure how many healthcare audits were performed by
their organisation during the last year, with the positive
responses ranging from one to four. One respondent
commented that “I would hope many smaller clinical
audits are done by staff in the field, we are trying to en-
courage this.” [P6].
Several participants commented that audits were con-
ducted, but this was “not systematic” [P5] with “no for-
mal structure” for data collection or analysis [P13].
Another participant felt that audits were unfeasible: “The
larger audits we have done show this is quite resource-
intensive, in terms of people and time. We usually focus
on smaller problem-solving approaches, such as address-
ing issues involved in M&M [morbidity and mortality]
reviews etc. Some plans are also made following medical
error reports.”[P7].
Among respondents whose organisation performed
audits (n = 10), audit activities included: direct observa-
tion of patient care (10/10, 100%), pharmaceutical stock
check (10/10, 100%), patient record review (9/9, 100%),
pharmaceutical cold chain audit (9/10, 90.0%), health fa-
cility spot checks (9/10, 90%), health service data audit
(8/10, 80.0%), procedural compliance checks (6/10,
60.0%), audit of staff training and competency (5/10,
50.0%) and audit of incident outcomes (5/10, 50.0%).
Audit findings were mainly shared with staff involved in
the audit (9/10, 90.0%), to a much lesser extent local
health authorities (4/10, 40.0%) and beneficiaries (1/10,
10.0%), and never with response co-ordination mecha-
nisms (0/10, 0.0%).
Further, the use of audits to improve service perform-
ance - rather than for monitoring compliance with fi-
nancial or administrative regulations - was not always
valued in surveyed organisations. One respondent noted
that “audits at point of health service delivery are done
constantly as part of our programming, but at HQ/
programme management level there are no standardised
audit systems or templates to cover overall programme
effectiveness.”[P9].
Incident management
Just over half of key informants (10/16, 62.5%)
responded that there was a system for reporting and in-
vestigating clinical incidents in their organisation, and
eight (n = 16, 50.0%) indicated that incident reporting
was mandatory. However, only six (n = 15, 40.0%)
reported an established process for their investigation.
Related guidelines were available in nine organisations
(n = 16, 56.3%), and 10 (n = 16, 62.5%) gave staff and
beneficiaries information on how to report incidents.
Similarly, a standardized incident reporting form was
available in nine (n = 15, 60%) organisations, and only
three (n = 15, 20.0%) had a protected budget for incident
management activities.
The fact that many organisations work predominantly
within local health systems appears to create some
division of responsibility for clinical incident reporting
and investigation. This was cited by several respondents
who felt it was outside of their organisation’s remit,
mentioning that “where clinical care is provided, there
are local incident reporting systems in place”(P8) and “all
reporting will go through [local Ministry of Health]” or
otherwise using “partners protocols and the accountabil-
ity team rather than the health team”(P3).
Respondents highlighted underreporting [P6] and the
perception that less serious incidents are not appropri-
ately acted upon [P5]. Table 5 suggests limited dissemin-
ation of feedback about incidents outside of healthcare
staff and highlights that between a quarter (3/14, 21.4%)
and half (7/15, 46.7%) of key informants do not know
with whom incident investigation findings are shared.
One key informant [P9] described a recent positive
change in practice from a system in which reports on in-
cident investigations at field level were rarely fed up-
wards to headquarters to now having yearly reporting of
incidents to the organisation board.
Evidence-based practice
We first asked about the use of information at the stage
of designing a humanitarian health project. All respon-
dents indicated using a wide range of information:
defining the target population, understanding the
current health and disease status of that population and
the current level of demand for health programming,
and identifying vulnerable and high-risk groups as sys-
tematic aspects of needs assessment. Cost and time ef-
fectiveness (9/15, 60.0%) and beneficiary representation
(9/16, 56.3%) were less frequently considered.
Concerning monitoring the performance of ongoing
projects, fewer than half (7/16, 43.8%) reported consistent
monitoring of the impact on the population’s health, 10
(n = 16, 62.5%) always compared outcomes to pre-defined
targets, two (n = 16, 12.5%) always compared outcomes to
similar programmes within their organization and two
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(n = 16, 12.5%) always compared outcomes to similar pro-
grammes in other organizations. Just over half (9/16,
52.3%) always compared outcomes to international
standards.
Five key informants reported that quality improvement
is a routine component of their organisation’s health
programmes (n = 15, 33.3%), and a further eight (n = 15,
53.3%) that QI is done on an ad-hoc basis. Two (n = 15,
13.3%) said QI did not feature in their health pro-
grammes at all. The most common barriers to QI were
lack of time (9/16, 56.3%), knowledge (9/16, 56.3%) and
funding (8/16, 50.0%). Five (n = 16, 31.3%) respondents
also felt unsure that results of QI initiatives would be
acted upon and three (n = 16, 18.8%) agreed that con-
cerns about repercussions for exposing sub-optimal
practice would act as a barrier. One respondent
commented “We are trying to change the ‘culture’ to be
less of blame and more of learning but this is an uphill
battle…” [P6].
When asked about the use of best practice technical
guidelines (e.g. WHO recommendations), key infor-
mants reported that these were available for clinical (15/
16, 93.8%) and other technical activities (including pub-
lic health and monitoring and evaluation) (13/16, 81.3%).
However, training on the use of guidelines was incon-
sistent (11/16, 68.8%), and they were not always trans-
lated into the local language (3/16, 18.8%). There was a
formal process for reviewing the guidelines in three-
quarters of cases (11/16, 73.3%) and most audited
adherence to them, either routinely (4/16, 3%) or on an
ad-hoc basis (11/16, 68.8%).
Two-thirds of respondents indicated that their organ-
isation conducted research (10/16, 62.5%). Only half of
these said their organisation had an internal ethical re-
view board (5/16, 31.3%). The latter may reflect the fact
that “research is 99% operational research” [P13] and
may not require ethical approval.
In their comments, participants highlighted a general
lack of evidence for humanitarian health action as in-
creasing their reliance on expert opinion and translation
of practice directly from high-income countries. Lack of
funding for and importance placed on research was also
noted, with one respondent suggesting that “…program-
ming staff are assuming that the interventions are
evidence based so [are] not overly keen to include re-
search in the budgets. This is also true of donors not
wanting to fund for baselines etc so we can assess qual-
ity.” [P3].
Pharmaceutical services
Pharmaceutical services appeared closely monitored and
standardized. Almost all key informants reported that:
there was a project lead for pharmaceutical supply and
management (15/16, 93.8%), with policies, guidelines or
standard operating procedures for pharmaceutical pro-
curement (14/16, 87.5%), storage of pharmaceutical sup-
plies (14/16, 87.5%), supply chain management (14/16,
87.5%), drug donation (14/16, 87.5%), safe drug disposal
(14/16, 87.5%), and stock management and inventory
(13/16, 81.3%).
Pharmacovigilance and supervision of rational pre-
scribing were less common, with about two-thirds
reporting supervisory arrangements (10/15, 66.7%) and
just over half reporting guidelines (9/16, 56.3%) for ra-
tional prescribing. Only six (n = 16, 37.5%) reported con-
ducting structured pharmacovigilance, and according to
written comments, this related mainly to specified drugs
using an incident reporting system.
Beneficiary feedback
Several participants commented that beneficiary feed-
back was a routine part of all services and integral to the
organisation’s philosophy. However, responses suggested
that this is implemented inconsistently. Only two (n =
15, 13.3%) key informants said that 100% of health pro-
jects incorporate beneficiary feedback, with a median of
70% (range 10 to 100%) of health projects doing so.
Guidelines to collect feedback were available according
to just under half (7/16, 43.8%) of respondents. Pro-
tected budgets and time for collecting and acting on
beneficiary feedback were available systematically in only
two cases (n = 16, 12.5%) and sometimes in a further
nine (n = 16, 56.3%). Six (n = 16, 37.5%) reported that
there was never a member of staff within each project
designated to manage feedback. Half (8/16, 50.0%) of
key informants said their field staff get adequate training
on collecting beneficiary feedback, and fewer (6/16,
37.5%) that they had adequate training to process this
Table 5 Incident management – to whom are findings of incident investigations made available? (Variable N as stated)
To whom are findings of incident
investigations made available?
Yes N (%) No N (%) Unsure N (%) Total N
Health care staff 9 (60) 2 (13.3) 4 (26.7) 15
Donors 6 (42.9) 5 (35.7) 3 (21.4) 14
Partner organisations 5 (35.7) 5 (35.7) 4 (28.6) 14
Affected individuals 7 (46.7) 2 (13.3) 6 (40) 15
Affected communities 3 (20) 5 (33.33) 7 (46.7) 15
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feedback. A minority (7/16, 43.8%) reported using a
grading scale for categorizing serious grievances to en-
sure an effective and adequate response. Table 6 shows
the modalities used by participants to collect feedback.
Two respondents mentioned the incentives for collect-
ing feedback as coming from donors or other external
pressures, and data not being well used:
“Although we have always gathered some feedback
as a matter of course, the universality of this is in
the most part due to fairly recent donor require-
ments…I'm not sure everyone is really using the feed-
back we now receive effectively to improve quality of
their programming, yet.” [P8]
“The only open interest from the organisation on
beneficiary and staff feedback is re: sexual assault
and fraud, otherwise…there is no accountability
mechanism in place” [P13]
Perceived importance and effectiveness of governance
domains
For every governance domain, the distribution of re-
sponses on the perceived importance of the domain
within the organisation was higher than for perceived ef-
fectiveness at tackling it (Fig. 2). Pharmaceutical services
had the highest median score for importance at 4.5, and
the lowest were HMIS, audit and incident management
with a median score of 3. Pharmaceutical services and
evidence-based practice had the highest score for effect-
iveness at 4, with incident management the lowest at 2.
When all seven governance areas were combined, the
median score for the importance of governance was 2 or
‘somewhat low’, and the median score for effectiveness
was 1 or ‘low’.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first study to describe
healthcare governance practice among large inter-
national humanitarian actors. Encouragingly, our results
suggest that many are already implementing healthcare
governance activities. However, these are inconsistently
applied and generally not the expression of systematic
policies and corresponding earmarked organisational re-
sources: an ad hoc approach seems more common.
Moreover, data and information on ‘problems’ (e.g. med-
ical incidents) is infrequently available at headquarters
level, where oversight and accountability should lie, and
to beneficiary communities. Incentives such as donor re-
quirements and external co-ordination mechanisms may
drive governance activities, but this may not necessarily
result in improved practice.
Healthcare governance for both clinical and public health
practice
The results of this survey mainly reflect clinical aspects
of governance. This is despite our broader aim and defi-
nitions of governance and accountability (see methods)
given in the first section of the questionnaire. As dem-
onstrated by the paucity of published examples of
healthcare governance in humanitarian aid, and their re-
striction to clinical activities, the concept of public
health malpractice is relatively novel in the sector. While
the use of the NHS framework in this study was
intended to translate well-established concepts of clinical
governance to public health, this design, as well as the
technical background of the respondent, may have inad-
vertently prompted participants to report knowledge and
experience of clinical governance rather than consider-
ing the broader definition we provided. This is a limita-
tion of our study. These results may also reflect the fact
that attempts to implement healthcare governance in
humanitarian NGOs have similarly relied on direct
translation of clinical governance practice from high-
income healthcare settings, representing the genuinely
narrow scope of healthcare governance policies in these
organisations.
Despite the limitation described above, our study
does provide some insights into governance practices
related to public health. While there was some uni-
formity of practice in the use of public health infor-
mation for programme design, there was substantial
variability in its use for monitoring performance. This
discrepancy perhaps reflects a lack of professional
consensus or guidance on how the effectiveness of
humanitarian health responses should be measured.
Responses highlight the need for the more strategic
and systematic use of public health data to inform
decision-making and that current tools, such as audit,
are underused for assessing public health programmes
compared to clinical services.
Evidence-based practice – not only related to clinical
but also public health programmes - was rated among
the most effective areas. We can interpret this high
rating in one of two ways: that proper use of quality in-
formation, guidelines and research is a genuine strength,
Table 6 Beneficiary feedback – modalities of data collection for
beneficiary feedback (N = 16)
Modalities of feedback Yes N (%) No N (%) Unsure N (%)
Face to face by caregiver 14 (87.5) 2 (12.5) 0 (0)
Text message (SMS) 6 (37.5) 8 (50) 2 (12.5)
Questionnaire at delivery point 15 (93.8) 1 (6.2) 0 (0)
Suggestion box 15 (93.8) 1 (6.2) 0 (0)
Focus groups 15 (93.8) 1 (6.2) 0 (0)
Community meetings 14 (87.5) 1 (6.2) 1 (6.2)
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or, an aspiration in contrast to the reality of poor collec-
tion and use of public health information, and the lack of
good evidence for specific health interventions [37, 38].
Cross-cutting findings
Our findings demonstrate potential for improvement
across all domains of healthcare governance. Insufficient
technical expertise and staff competence have repeatedly
been identified as a contributor to humanitarian re-
sponse failings [6, 20]. As illustrated by the quotes about
professional development, our findings suggest institu-
tional gaps that contribute to this problem, such as lack
of assessment of staff competency and professional de-
velopment needs, difficulty in accessing training, and
lack of formal professional development opportunities.
Good governance should enforce standards for recruit-
ment, training and supervision of health staff. The
WHO Emergency Medical Teams (EMT) programme
[39] and the Humanitarian Quality Assurance Initiative
[16] to accredit organisations against the Core Humani-
tarian Standard [15] are current attempts to certify ac-
tors based on agreed benchmarks of capability. There
are disadvantages to these approaches, but at the system
level, they may introduce accountability to accrediting
bodies and incentivize self-improvement [4].
Engagement of beneficiaries was a recurrent weakness.
Responses suggested poor commitment of resources and
training for beneficiary engagement and concerns that
feedback is not acted upon, and that this activity is often
driven more by the need to satisfy donor requirements
than to improve services. Furthermore, institutional
culture seems to affect how such deficiencies can be
countered. Participants mentioned fear of exposing mal-
practice and a culture of blame within organisations,
challenges common to health systems with established
governance cultures [40].
It is encouraging that technical guidelines were widely
available to staff, and their use audited, if only to some
extent. However, the lack of translation of these guide-
lines to local languages suggests that local staff not
speaking UN languages may be excluded from accessing
the guidance and expertise needed for effective decision-
making. Such findings demonstrate how efforts to regu-
late humanitarian health action - healthcare governance
being an example - may have unintended consequences
[5] which should be considered in attempts at sector-
wide reform.
Limitations
Our findings may be subject to various biases. Firstly, se-
lection bias may have arisen from the inclusion criteria.
Our criteria privilege large organisations with a multi-
country footprint, meaning our findings may not be rep-
resentative of smaller, local entities, whose operational
involvement in humanitarian action is ever-growing, or
of donor institutions. Questions of governance are in-
trinsically linked to power through an emphasis on
technocratic processes and expertise that are inevitably
unevenly distributed in the humanitarian system [4]. We
chose to study large international NGOs explicitly be-
cause of their influence on norms and reform in the hu-
manitarian sector, but acknowledge this echoes the
existing power structure rather than interrogating it.
Further work to build consensus about humanitarian
healthcare governance should examine the practices of
other actors and consider the role of donors in incentiv-
izing or distorting healthcare governance practice.
Equally, this study does not explore the elements of
governance that relate to the relationship between large
Fig. 2 Median score rating for perceived importance and effectiveness of each governance domain (1-low, 5-high)/
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international NGOs and state health actors. This is a
consideration distinct to healthcare governance in hu-
manitarian settings and is likely to vary depending on
the type and duration of the crisis and the relationship
of the state to the affected population. Further study on
where accountability lies in different crisis scenarios,
particularly when NGOs are supporting rather than dir-
ectly providing services, is needed.
Additional selection bias is likely as a result of survey
attrition: while we do not believe that reticence to pro-
vide information explains the low survey response, ac-
tors who filled out the questionnaire may have more
established headquarters technical expertise, and thus
stronger governance provisions, than those who did not:
as such, our findings may paint an overly optimistic
picture.
Information biases are also plausible: our question-
naire was lengthy, potentially resulting in respondent fa-
tigue and diminishing quality of responses (however,
there was little attrition in responses across the ques-
tionnaire). Not all terms were defined, so respondents
may have interpreted questions in ways specific to their
organisation and their technical background, limiting the
comparability of answers. Respondents (mainly senior
headquarters experts) may not have detailed insight into
all domains of the survey, or may have lacked perspec-
tive on how healthcare governance is implemented at
lower levels of the organisation. Although participants
were aware that their responses would not be published,
we cannot discount that social desirability bias may have
incentivized overly optimistic responses. Our question-
naire did not sufficiently distinguish between occasional
and systematic practices (for example, respondents may
have answered that their organisation operates a health
information system even if, in fact, only some of its field
projects do this, and irrespective of whether this is a
centrally-driven or ad-hoc practice).
Conclusion: towards a model of healthcare
governance for humanitarian health responses
The humanitarian environment poses complex chal-
lenges for healthcare governance. Achieving consensus
and consistency of practice is problematic as actors vary
in size and technical expertise, individual NGOs may
work in a range of crisis and sociocultural contexts and
the degree to which they work with or separately to a
state government and local health system varies. High
turnover of program staff and short-term funding cycles
– not to mention the moral urgency to respond as
swiftly and decisively as possible - makes establishing ro-
bust, routinized processes for governance difficult. It was
outside the scope of this study to explore all the context-
ual factors that influence healthcare governance in the
humanitarian sector. However, it is clear that a unique
model of healthcare governance, adapted for the chal-
lenges described above, is needed for humanitarian
settings.
As a first step forward, consensus should be reached
on what healthcare governance is and consists of in hu-
manitarian response. In settings where public health
needs evolve rapidly and exceptional threats (e.g. malnu-
trition, epidemics) arise, appropriate public health
decision-making on what health services to offer, how
and to whom becomes critical and is far more complex
than in stable contexts where Ministries of Health take
such decisions over long time horizons. We thus
propose that ‘public health malpractice’ be considered
within the scope of humanitarian healthcare governance,
and better defined to help actors recognize and respond
to it.
Conceptualizing humanitarian healthcare governance
should also explicitly consider which actors and ele-
ments of the humanitarian system determine its effect-
iveness, and where relative power lies. For example,
inadequate, conditional and short-term funding can ob-
struct needs-based decision-making and the ability to
act on information about errors and poor performance.
Competition over scarce resources may create perverse
incentives not to document shortcomings that could be
reputation-damaging [20]. Accordingly, the role and re-
sponsibility of donors in healthcare governance should
be investigated.
Participant survey responses suggest a tension between
organisational accountability and priorities and the need
to support local health systems, whose standards may
differ. Shared responsibility for service delivery may cre-
ate confusion or an assumption that humanitarian actors
should abdicate responsibility for what may ultimately
be regarded as the remit of national health authorities.
In response to recurrent failings of humanitarian aid in
general, Spiegel proposes a model for co-ordination in
humanitarian responses in which the intensity and au-
tonomy of NGO and UN involvement varies based on
different scenarios of local capacity and respect for hu-
manitarian principles [41]. Such a model could also be
applied to governance practices. Either way, consensus
should be achieved on who is wholly or partly respon-
sible for delivering adequate healthcare in different hu-
manitarian response scenarios, or at the very least, a
process for how this will be determined in different crisis
contexts should be agreed .
Even if a sector-wide consensus on governance mea-
sures were reached, its monitoring and enforcement will
remain problematic, as is the appropriate balance be-
tween punitive and supportive responses to malpractice.
Consideration should be given to whether and what
inter-agency body could take on this role. The World
Health Organization is a natural candidate, given its
Jarrett et al. Conflict and Health           (2021) 15:25 Page 11 of 13
technical pre-eminence and leadership of the humanitar-
ian Health Cluster. However, the effectiveness and inde-
pendence of the WHO in emergency response have
come under scrutiny, particularly following the 2014–15
Ebola outbreak in West Africa [42, 43].
Ultimately, the perspective of patients and beneficiary
communities needs to guide future directions: vulner-
able, often disenfranchised populations affected by crises
have as valid a claim to appropriate, effective healthcare
as people in rich, stable countries. Accordingly, stan-
dards of humanitarian healthcare governance and ac-
countability should not fall short.
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